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ABSTRACT: To achieve the aims of the Affordable Care Act, state and federal regulators 
must construct an effective system of risk adjustment, one that protects health insurers that 
attract a disproportionate share of patients with poor health risks. This brief, which sum-
marizes a Commonwealth Fund–supported conference of leading risk adjustment experts, 
explores the challenges regulators will face, considers the consequences of the law’s risk 
adjustment provisions, and analyzes the merits of different risk adjustment strategies. 
Among other recommendations, the brief suggests that regulators use diagnostic rather 
than only demographic risk measures, that they allow states some but limited flexibility to 
tailor risk adjustment methods to local circumstances, and that they phase in the use of risk 
transfer payments to give insurers more time to predict and understand the full effects of 
risk adjustment.
            
WHY RISK ADJUSTMENT IS IMPORTANT
State and federal regulators must accomplish many daunting tasks for imple-
mentation of health insurance reform to succeed. Among the most important is 
constructing an effective system of risk adjustment. Risk adjustment provides a 
behind-the-scenes mechanism to correct for market imbalances that occur if some 
insurers attract pools of subscribers whose expected medical costs are substan-
tially greater or less than marketwide averages. It helps to accomplish this by sub-
sidizing insurers that end up with a disproportionate share of high-cost patients 
and assessing competing insurers that—either through strategy or happenstance—
end up with a better selection of health risks.  
The need for risk adjustment arises from the skewed nature of health risk. 
As Exhibit 1 illustrates, if a population is sorted by its treatment costs each year, 
a remarkable pattern emerges: the top 20 percent of the population accounts for 
about 80 percent of total spending. The very highest medical costs are concen-
trated in the top 1 percent. And a full 50 percent of the population, which incurs 
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few to no expenses, accounts for only 3 percent of 
overall spending. 
This heavy concentration of medical costs 
strongly influences market dynamics. Insurers that 
attract more than their share of the top 20 percent 
will have trouble staying in business, while those that 
attract more than their share of the bottom half profit 
handsomely based on the risk status of the subscribers 
they attract or avoid. Therefore, insurers adopt various 
strategies to balance their risk pools or to come out 
ahead in the luck of the draw.
A central aim of the Affordable Care Act 
is to create market conditions in which insurers’ 
prices reflect the underlying value and efficiency 
of their products rather than the composition of 
their risk pools.1 To focus competition on value and 
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efficiency—which are defined by the scope of covered 
benefits, quality of care, and cost efficiency provided—
the law prohibits insurers from refusing coverage based 
on medical condition, excluding coverage of preexist-
ing conditions, or varying prices according to health 
status of those purchasing insurance in the individual 
and small-group markets. 
Prohibiting these risk assessment and risk 
selection techniques leaves insurers vulnerable to 
attracting a disproportionate share of patients with poor 
health risks. This vulnerability might cause them to 
leave the market or encourage them to use more covert 
or indirect means of risk avoidance, such as selective 
marketing or structuring their provider networks to 
exclude the doctors or hospitals preferred by higher 
risk patients.2  
Even without such manipulation, people’s pref-
erences for insurance coverage, which naturally vary 
according to their anticipated needs, also create market 
imbalances.3 Patients with higher anticipated medical 
costs tend to prefer products that require less patient 
cost-sharing, while those with cancer history often seek 
insurers whose networks offer a wide choice of oncolo-
gists. These preferences, and the uneven risk distribu-
tion that ensues from them, could make some insurers, 
providers, or benefit options unaffordable or less avail-
able, regardless of their underlying value. Uneven risk 
distribution could also damage the effectiveness of the 
new insurance exchanges created by the health reform 
law.4 This brief provides guidance to state and federal 
regulators seeking to avoid these potential problems.
RISK ADJUSTMENT IN STATUTORY AND 
MARKET CONTEXT
The Affordable Care Act takes several steps to miti-
gate risk selection.5 Except for grandfathered plans, 
it requires insurers in the individual and small-group 
markets to offer similar sets of essential benefits. The 
Act also requires insurers to charge their individual or 
small-group subscribers the same rates regardless of 
whether the coverage is sold through the new insur-
ance exchanges or regular insurance markets. Finally, 
subscribers who want to receive premium subsidies 
or tax credits must purchase through the exchanges. 
These and other measures (such as limited open 
enrollment periods) will reduce some risk skewing 
but will not eliminate all potential risk-selection prob-
lems. Realizing this, Congress created three specific 
mechanisms—risk adjustment, risk corridors, and 
reinsurance—to mitigate insurer risk and to reduce the 
Exhibit 1. Five Percent of the Population Accounts for 
Nearly Half of U.S. Health Expenditures, 2002
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incentives for risk selection under the market structures 
that will form starting in 2014.6
These mechanisms also address problems that 
may arise from the new exchange structure, which 
enables similar insurance markets to operate side-
by-side and inside and outside of the exchange. It is 
important to assure that these different market seg-
ments compete on equal footing. If the market outside 
of the exchange attracts more favorable risks, the 
viability of exchanges might be threatened. It is also 
important to ensure that the prices charged for differ-
ent policies offered through exchanges—defined as 
bronze, silver, gold, and platinum—reflect differences 
in their benefits and efficiency, and not differences in 
the risk of subscribers within each level. 
The first mechanism, risk adjustment, is a per-
manent feature of the Affordable Care Act. The other 
two mechanisms—risk corridors and reinsurance—are 
transitional, meaning they will remain in place for 
three years to protect insurers in the start-up years 
when market dynamics and enrollee mix are uncertain, 
and when a sicker mix of enrollees will first transition 
from the Temporary Federal High Risk Pools to the 
individual market. Risk corridors and reinsurance each 
address a somewhat different aspect of risk, using dif-
ferent means and funding sources, as summarized in 
Exhibit 2.
WHAT RISK ADJUSTMENT CAN AND 
CANNOT DO
Under the Affordable Care Act, the insurance market 
will be divided into various market gradients, each of 
which has the potential for skewed risk distribution, as 
follows:
1. Self-insured vs. insured plans. Insured plans must 
charge average “community” rates to each pur-
chaser; self-insured plans are rated according to 
their particular claims experience. This creates a 
very strong incentive for lower-risk groups to self-
insure to avoid paying more than their actuarial 
risk. If this happens, then the market’s average 
actuarial risk increases, driving up the premiums 
of insured plans. This problem is limited as long 
as exchanges are open only to groups up to 50 
employees, which usually are not large enough 
to consider self-insuring, but the problem might 
become more serious when the Affordable Care 
Act’s market reforms extend the small-group rules 
to groups of up to 100, since self-insurance is 
financially more viable for larger groups.
2. Plans inside vs. outside the exchanges. Insurers in 
the exchanges must offer the richer benefit options, 
while those outside the exchanges can limit their 
offerings to a leaner level. Insurers that sell both 
inside and outside the exchanges are required to 
price their products consistently, which should 
mitigate selection effects between their exchange 
Exhibit 2. Relationship Among the “Three R’s”
Time span
Market segments 
(except  
grandfathered plans)
Type of risk 
addressed Funding source
Risk adjustment Permanent
Individual and small group, 
inside and outside of 
insurance exchanges
Attracting more 
high-risk or fewer 
low-risk patients than 
competitors
Transfer payments 
among insurers so that 
one’s gains equal losses
Risk corridors Transitional(3 years) Individual and small group
Incorrect estimation of 
average (or total) costs 
in the start-up years
Unspecified
Reinsurance Transitional (3 years)
Individual only, inside  
and outside of  
insurance exchanges
High-cost subscribers 
brought into the market 
by guaranteed issue
$20 billion from 
assessments of 
insurers and third-party 
administrators
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and nonexchange products, but this rate pooling 
will not address the situation of insurers that sell 
only outside the exchanges. If such insurers were 
to attract better risks than the exchanges, ineffec-
tive risk adjustment might handicap the exchanges, 
keeping their coverage from being competitive 
with coverage available outside the exchanges.
3. Insurers inside the exchanges. Exchanges are 
meant to increase competition based on consumer 
value, as measured by covered benefits, quality 
of care, and cost efficiency. If some insurers end 
up attracting more high- or low-risk patients than 
others, these risk differences may dwarf whatever 
value differences plans might present.7 Uneven risk 
distribution can happen randomly, through natu-
ral consumer preferences, or via strategic insurer 
behaviors. Mitigating these risk differences is criti-
cal to making the new exchanges function as effec-
tively as possible.
4. Different benefit tiers offered by the same insurer. 
Both bronze and catastrophic plans are expected 
to attract lower-cost patients because they have 
higher cost-sharing requirements, while silver 
plans are expected to attract a disproportionate 
number of high-cost subscribers whose incomes 
fall below 250 percent of the federal poverty level. 
This is because silver-plan enrollment is neces-
sary to receive the government subsidies that limit 
cost-sharing for lower-income people. To gauge 
the potential magnitude of this effect, RAND 
Corporation used its micro-simulation model8 
to project likely premiums assuming maximum 
participation in the exchanges under different sce-
narios.9 It estimated that the silver plan’s premium 
without risk adjustment could be as much as twice 
its actuarial value for people of average risk. In 
contrast, the bronze plan’s premium (in a some-
what different scenario) could be 20 percent less 
than its actuarial value for people of average risk. 
This risk sorting across benefit plans will cre-
ate several difficulties. Among the most critical is that 
the Affordable Care Act uses the silver plan’s premium 
to benchmark the government’s premium subsidy for 
individuals below 400 percent of the federal poverty 
level. Thus, not risk-adjusting the silver plan’s pre-
mium could greatly increase government costs. 
Risk adjustment addresses possibilities two 
and four above (risk distribution inside and outside the 
exchanges). But, for risk adjustment to be effective, 
insurers will need to reflect the risk payments they 
make or receive in the premium rates they charge. For 
that to happen effectively, it is important for the risk 
adjustment methodology to be transparent and predict-
able so insurers can anticipate its likely effects in plan-
ning their rate structures.10 It is also important to rec-
ognize, however, that the risk adjustment system itself 
does not determine whether particular premium rates 
are reasonable or adequate. That job is left to insurers 
and regulators, subject to minimum medical loss ratios. 
Risk adjustment explicitly does not address the 
self-insured vs. insured selection gradient, as described 
in the first category. Although reinsurance partially 
reaches this dimension of selection, it does so only for 
high-cost outlier cases in the individual market, and it 
is limited to three years.  
Risk adjustment will help to counteract or 
mitigate risk differences between exchange and non-
exchange insurers, and among insurers within the 
exchanges. However, risk adjustment will not neces-
sarily address directly the risk differences, described 
in category three above, that are likely to occur among 
the different benefit tiers offered by each insurer within 
the exchange. The Affordable Care Act’s language 
references risk adjusting between insurers at the entity 
level, based on each insurer’s aggregate risk profile. It 
is entirely possible, however, to apply risk adjustment 
weights to each benefit package within an insurer’s 
overall block of business, before summing up to the 
entity level. That way, insurers, state regulators, and 
exchanges will know the relative risk profiles of bronze 
versus silver subscribers, for instance, and so can 
determine what adjustments in premium rates might be 
appropriate to keep premiums in proportion to relative 
actuarial value of benefits.  
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DESIGNING RISK ADJUSTMENT
Areas of Consensus and Uncertainty
When first implemented in the mid-1980s, health-
based risk adjustment was crude and its potential effec-
tiveness not fully realized,11 but in the ensuing decades 
improvements have been made and obstacles over-
come.12 Risk adjustment of payments to both insurers 
and providers is now operational and widely accepted 
in many domestic and international settings. Although 
risk adjustment methods will always be a work in 
progress and will require refinement or correction over 
time, there is now an ample base of experience to draw 
from in a variety of settings.  
The key to risk adjustment is how and when 
risk levels are assessed. Risk is assessed for each per-
son relative to a population average (or “norm”).13 For 
instance, a score of 1.2 means the person is expected 
to incur 20 percent more cost per year than an average 
person, and a score of .8 means someone is expected 
to incur 20 percent less annual cost. (Costs refer to 
standardized costs for covered services, regardless of 
patients’ cost-sharing.)  
There are two basic measures to assess health 
risk—demographic and medical—and two basic meth-
ods: prospective and concurrent. Demographic assess-
ment measures the expected medical costs according to 
population averages for age, gender, and location. (It is 
also possible to use income, race/ethnicity, or national-
ity/citizenship, but this is seldom or never done in the 
context of adjusting insurers’ premiums.)14 Medical 
assessment measures refer to actual diagnostic or treat-
ment information collected from claims (or encounter) 
data.15 Importantly, this information is not simply what 
costs were incurred, since that would be tantamount 
simply to experience-rating or cost-based reimburse-
ment. Instead, information about the presence of a 
key diagnosis or use of prescription medication, for 
instance, is used to infer the possibility of total costs 
that might arise from a range of possible treatments 
that are statistically associated with the diagnosis or 
medication. 
Risk can be assessed in one of two time 
perspectives.16 Prospective assessment uses risk 
information from a prior period (usually a year) to 
predict likely costs in the upcoming year. Concurrent 
assessment uses information from the current year to 
measure each person’s expected health care costs that 
year. Each of these measures and methods has multiple 
fine points of variation and nuance. There is no single 
accepted best way to do risk adjustment, and various 
current options present inevitable trade-offs among 
competing objectives.17 Nevertheless, there appears to 
be broad agreement on the following points: 
•	 Adjustment based on demographic factors alone 
is insufficient. Adjustment based on diagnostic 
information is much more accurate than that based 
on demographics alone.18 To demonstrate this, 
Jonathan Weiner of Johns Hopkins University 
recently conducted a simulation that randomly 
assigned 50,000 members to each of 25 hypo-
thetical health plans. Confirming several previous 
analyses by other researchers, he found that the 
best diagnosis-based adjuster is about five times 
more accurate than demographic adjustment, as 
measured by the percent by which the risk adjuster 
would overpay the lowest-risk plan or underpay 
the highest-risk plan.
•	 Using diagnostic information is generally feasible 
for all types of health plans. This is now done both 
for Medicare Advantage plans nationwide and for 
at least some Medicaid enrollees in approximately 
20 states.19 To the extent that some health plans 
currently lack the necessary systems to supply 
data, some may decide to exit the individual and/
or small-group health insurance market. Those 
who remain are likely to adopt the necessary 
data systems in the foreseeable future as part of 
improving health information systems generally. 
Requiring health plans to collect systematic diag-
nostic information for risk adjustment purposes 
will assist them with other endeavors, such as care 
management, contracting with accountable care 
organizations, and adapting to “pay for perfor-
mance” systems, all of which are also included in 
the Affordable Care Act. 
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•	 Supplying diagnostic information will be more 
of a burden on some health plans than on oth-
ers, depending on their current infrastructure and 
experience with diagnostic risk adjustment. The 
concurrent implementation of a new diagnosis 
classification system creates additional challenges. 
However, many of the existing diagnostic risk 
assessment tools have already been mapped to 
ICD-10 for use in other countries. 
•	 Using diagnostic information will likely lead to 
some degree of upcoding (i.e., increased iden-
tification of higher-cost conditions),20 but some 
degree of increased diagnostic coding is desirable 
in order to correct for inaccurate or undercod-
ing. Excessive upcoding can be addressed through 
auditing, annual corrections to keep the system at 
a standardized population level of 1.0, and peri-
odic recalibration of relative diagnostic weights to 
reflect evolving clinical practices. 
•	 Adjustment based on pharmacy information is also 
considerably more accurate than rating based on 
demographics alone, but somewhat less accurate 
than using encounter-based diagnostic informa-
tion.21 Using combined diagnostic and pharmacy 
data is only modestly more accurate than using 
diagnostic information alone. 
Conference participants and published literature 
indicate no clear consensus on the following key design 
points, and so various options and factors should be 
weighed and considered. One set of methods might be 
used in the initial years, with a transition to a more per-
manent approach, with refinements along the way.
•	 Pharmacy data are usually easier to obtain than 
diagnostic data, but using pharmacy data creates 
worrisome incentives to encourage altering treat-
ment patterns in order to increase risk scores. 
•	 Prospective risk adjustment requires a longer 
enrollment history to generate an accurate risk 
score, but it gives insurers advance notice of what 
their financial obligations will be. It is also tied 
only to the expected spending of enrollees and thus 
does not provide incentives to deliver more care 
within a year. Concurrent risk adjustment can more 
accurately reflect actual spending, especially when 
there is greater membership turnover, but concur-
rent adjustment can delay final reconciliation, pos-
sibly substantially, depending on the type of data 
used. Concurrent risk adjustment would make the 
insurers’ task of pricing products harder, but ulti-
mately would more accurately reflect the variation 
in spending among plans.
•	 When individuals first join plans, risk rating is 
more difficult because new subscribers lack a track 
record with the plan. There are three basic choices: 
1) no risk rating; 2) rating based only on demo-
graphics; and 3) rating based on medical informa-
tion from prior coverage. The third option is much 
more accurate, but more cumbersome. However, 
the experience of states that share claims data 
across plans for purposes of profiling providers can 
help inform this issue. If risk data cannot be trans-
ferred among plans, the percentage of the popula-
tion lacking medical risk information could be 
substantial. Turnover rates for small-group enroll-
ees can be in the range of 35 percent to 40 percent 
per year,22 which is much more frequent than for 
Medicare or disabled Medicaid beneficiaries.
Centralized vs. Distributed Data and  
Rate-Calculation Systems
A major issue for regulators to decide is whether 
risk scoring should be done centrally, by a govern-
ment agency or contractor, or through a distributed or 
decentralized system that relies on insurers to calculate 
their own scores based on centrally determined algo-
rithms and data elements. Medicare and most or all 
Medicaid agencies use a centralized system because 
this improves the integrity and consistency of data and 
scoring among competing insurers. Also, from a regu-
latory perspective, a central system could collect data 
for various monitoring and administrative purposes. 
However, public concerns about medical pri-
vacy might be considerably greater with a centralized 
data collection system. Although a centralized system 
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is accepted for public insurance, privacy advocates 
may have much greater concern about using this 
method for private insurance. Privacy objectors might 
be quite vocal, considering the depth of divided public 
sentiment about the health reform law in general and 
the individual mandate in particular. A distributed sys-
tem could avoid the need to report, collect, and store 
large amounts of medical data in a centralized location. 
There are many challenges, however, with 
doing risk calculations at the plan level, particularly 
in the early years of the program. Experience in other 
programs shows that several years of data reporting 
requirements are needed before plans consistently 
are able to provide good quality data for risk adjust-
ment calculations. Insurers are justifiably concerned 
that they may lose out to their competitors in the 
risk adjustment process based on inaccurate data or 
wrongly applied scoring algorithms. Maintaining insur-
ers’ trust in a risk transfer system might require having 
risk scores and their underlying data verified through a 
third-party audit process. 
Nevertheless, a partially decentralized system 
might be possible if insurers were required to adopt 
standardized data formats and components, subject to 
selective auditing. For instance, rather than all claims 
records, insurers could transfer only a “flagged” file, 
indicating whether each of a limited number of risk 
indicators or “grouper” categories is present or absent. 
Another possibility is for insurers to report medical 
information in a de-identified but coded form for cen-
tral computation of individual risk scores, with those 
scores then reported back to insurers for verification. 
If risk scores need to be tracked individually, insur-
ers could report summary scores to the central agency 
that have patient identifiers but not detailed medical 
information.  
In sum, it will be difficult to reach a 
compromise that satisfies all concerns, but 
consideration should be given to structuring data 
and reporting systems so that patient identifiers 
are separated from potentially sensitive medical 
information to the extent possible. 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
State-Level Variation
Whatever approach ultimately governs risk adjustment 
under the Affordable Care Act, careful thought should 
be given to the best implementation strategy. One 
important issue to consider is how much flexibility 
states should have to vary risk adjustment methods to 
meet local factors and preferences. Although the statute 
requires the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, in consultation with states, to “establish cri-
teria and methods to be used in carrying out the risk 
adjustment activities under” the Affordable Care Act, 
it appears consistent with the statute to allow some 
variation among states. Federal rules or guidance could 
sanction a range of possible approaches, or specify a 
standard approach but allow for states to request modi-
fications. Or, the federal standard could specify common 
data elements but allow variation in the scoring algo-
rithms or methods, as well as how they are phased in.
Exhibit 3 presents reasons that favor and 
disfavor standardization in risk adjustment methods. 
Considering them, there was general agreement among 
meeting participants that states should be allowed 
some limited flexibility to choose a scoring system or 
approach. However, it would be highly desirable to 
standardize nationally the data elements and structure 
required for risk adjustment, even if particular scoring 
systems and methods vary across states.
Implementation Issues
It is always challenging to initiate a new risk adjust-
ment system, but several factors make the process 
especially challenging here. First, in the initial year 
insurers will lack the requisite baseline experience to 
calibrate risk scores to the exact populations covered 
or to conduct prospective risk adjustment. Second, 
market conditions for individual and small-group 
insurance could dramatically differ in 2014; this would 
create substantial uncertainty about the reliability of 
prior experience with similar adjustment methods. 
The many unknowns about the new market conditions 
are likely to make it difficult for insurers to set their 
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initial premiums. Some may hesitate to participate in 
the individual and/or small-group market until more 
experience emerges. However, large plans are likely 
to want to participate early to capture a share of the 
new enrollees. Finally, issues of trust loom large in the 
mind of insurers when risk transfer payments are made 
among competitors.
Based on these considerations, there was gen-
eral agreement on the following points:
•	 The risk adjustment methods used the first year or 
two might differ substantially from than those even-
tually adopted. For instance, the first year might use 
concurrent adjustment based only on demographics 
and pharmacy data, before transitioning to prospec-
tive adjustment using diagnostic data.
•	 To build confidence among insurers and prevent 
inevitable glitches and problems, regulators should 
perform simulations of critical data transfers and 
initial scoring systems.
•	 Consideration should be given to making only a 
portion of the risk transfer payments that might be 
otherwise justified in the early years. This dilution 
of risk adjustment would give insurers more time to 
predict and understand the full effects of risk adjust-
ment. The downside of such a phased-in approach is 
that it would under-compensate some insurers. 
•	 There is a trade-off between structuring data sys-
tems to capture all the information that might 
eventually be needed and keeping data require-
ments to a minimum during the initial years. One 
possible resolution is to specify full, anticipated 
data requirements at the outset, but indicate which 
elements will be essential or required in the first 
year or two.
CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act presents an opportunity to 
make the health care system more accessible and 
affordable, especially for patients with preexisting or 
chronic health conditions. But accomplishing health 
reform’s goals requires effective risk adjustment to 
ensure that the highly skewed distribution of medical 
costs across any population does not destabilize insur-
ance markets by favoring some insurers over others. 
Although risk adjustment may be the thickest of tech-
nocratic regulatory weeds, wading into this thicket is 
critical if insurance reforms are to succeed. 
Exhibit 3. Factors Informing the Degree of Standardization in Risk Adjustment Methods
Reasons favoring standardization Reasons favoring state variation
Market structures
More consistency across states for 
regional or national insurers.
Local market conditions will vary according to many factors, 
including: whether the individual and small-group markets are 
merged; the size, structure, and market share of each exchange; 
the distinctiveness of local provider networks; and the degree of 
managed care in the local market.
Available knowledge base
National uniformity will generate a deeper 
and wider knowledge base.
Matching private insurance risk adjustment methodologies to 
those used for Medicaid or state employee programs would 
leverage existing local experience, knowledge, and administrative 
capacity.
Risk score portability
It is simpler to transfer risk scores when 
subscribers move out of state (although 
conversion factors can be devised that 
handle this).
Harmonizing methods with Medicaid could facilitate transfer of 
risk scores when people move back and forth between public and 
private coverage. 
Stakeholders
Designing risk adjustment systems is 
complicated and can be contentious. 
Having more local options may prove 
cumbersome and divisive.
Local participation in system design might promote buy-in 
and confidence by various stakeholders, which could aid 
implementation and enforcement.
Oversight and administration
Centralized administration is simpler to 
conduct and oversee. 
Centralized administration is still possible, for instance by 
contracting with a third-party intermediary that has capacity to 
accommodate variation among programs.
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